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whether  market  competition  stimulates  innovation.  To  reconcile  conflicting  earlier 
empirical  evidence,  Aghion  and  Griffith  (2005)  developed  a  model  showing  that 
competition can have both a positive and a negative effect on innovation, depending on 
the degree of competition in the market. 
Following  Aghion  and  Griffith’s  work,  this  paper  empirically  examines  the 
effect of market competition – measured either by the Herfindahl Index or the Lerner 
Index  –  on  productivity  growth  and  R&D  intensity  using  micro  data  for  Japan’s 
manufacturing sector. We found evidence of an inverted U­shaped relationship between 



































and  Newbery  (1982)  showed  that  firms  which  dominate  a  product  market  have  the 
incentive  to  innovate  in  order  to  maintain  their  monopolistic  position. 
1  And  in  the 




stimulated  a  wave  of empirical  studies  in the  1990s. 
















from  financial  intermediaries  and  effects  of  shareholders  on  managers’  efforts  to 







These  empirical  results  obtained  in  the  1990s  supported  the  idea  that  market 






into  two  types.  One  type  of  firm  belongs  to  a  sector  in  which  firms  compete 













Swedish  manufacturing  firm data and  found evidence that such a relationship  holds 
between the Herfindahl  index and R&D activities. The empirical studies referred to 
above  focused  on  the  innovative  activities  of  incumbents.  However,  deregulation 
promotes  the  entry  of  firms  and  affects  market  structure.  Against  this  background, 
Geroski (1989), for example, examined the effects of new entrants on productivity in 
the  U.K.  in  the  1970s.  He  concluded  that  new  entrants  had  a  positive  impact  on 
productivity  in  the  long  run,  although  the  estimated  effects  of  new  entrants  were 











Ernst  (2002)  and  Aghion  and  Griffith  (2005).  They  showed  that  pro­employer 
deregulation  increased  the  incentive  to  innovate.  Moreover,  Nicolleti  and  Scarapetta 
(2003) showed for OECD countries that the lower entry barriers and state controls are, 




empirical  studies  have  examined  the  effects  of  deregulation  and  the  reform  of 
competition policies in Japan. One of the few exceptions is the study by Okada (2005), 
who, following Nickell (1996), estimated a production function including competition 
measures  and  R&D  intensity  using  Japanese  firm­level  data.  His  estimation  results 




results also showed that deregulation enhances TFP growth at the industrial level. 
The aim of this paper is to improve on the previous empirical studies on Japan by 
considering several new measures of competition and regulation. First, based on Aghion 
and  Griffith  (2005),  we  examine  the  inverted  U­shaped  relationship  between 
competition and innovative activity, an aspect that Okada (2005) did not examined in 
his  paper.  Second,  we  consider  the  effect  of  new  entrants  on  the  performance  of8 
incumbents. Measuring the gap from the technology frontier and using the FDI ratio, we 
are able to examine the effect of the threat of new entrants on incumbents’ innovative 







our  estimation and  provides  the  empirical hypotheses,  while  Section  4  presents  and 
discusses our estimation results on the effects of competition and deregulation on firm 





model  was  developed  by  Aghion  and  Howitt  (1992,  1998),  who,  in an endogenous 
growth framework, showed that firms which earn monopoly rents have greater incentive 
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it  A : productivity of intermediate input in sector i at time t 




can  produce  the  same  input  at  a  constant  marginal  cost,  it  sets  the  limit  price  of 
intermediate input i at the constant marginal cost (m): 
(2)  m  p  it  =  (we assume 
a 
1 
1  <  < m  ) 
where  it  p  is the price of intermediate input i in terms of the final goods price. The more 
competition there is in the intermediate goods market, the lower the value of m becomes. 
Hence, the parameter m is an inverse measure of the degree of competition. 
We assume the final­goods­producing sector is competitive. Using the maximizing 
condition of a final goods producer, we find that  it  p  is equal to marginal productivity: 
(3) 
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1  )  2  /  1  (  q  gA  t-  on  an  R&D  project,  it  achieves  an  improvement  in 








1  -  -  =  t  t  A  A  . On the other hand, the productivity of the type­1 firm is 
one step behind the technology frontier in period t­1, that is,  2 
1 




it  p  ) are expressed as follows:11 
(6) 
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2  1  1  q  A  g  q  m  h  A  A  t  t  t  q  -  -  -  -  - 
The first order condition with respect to 
1  q  in (7) is: 





q  -  = 
Equation (8) implies that a less competitive market structure (that is, a small m) 











it  p  ) are: 









-  =  t  t  A  A  . Therefore, the type­0 firm faces a competitive market and its 
profits are 
(10)  1 
0  )  (  -  =  t  it  A  m  h  p 
The  type­0  firm  chooses  the  level  of R&D  effort  that  maximizes  the  following 
expected net rent: 
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where 
i s  is the share of type j firms in the total intermediate sector (j=0,1).13 
Equation (13) indicates that the effect of competition on R&D activities depends on 














only  when  it  succeeds  in  innovating  and  the  potential  competitor  fails  to  enter  the 
market. We assume that the new entrant has to pay fixed costs when it enters the market. 
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we  have  59,455  observations  for  the  natural  log  of  relative  TFP  (lnTFP )  and  the 




5  We  drop  firms  for  which  the  absolute  value  in  TFP  ln  or  TFP  d ln  exceeds  three  standard 
variations  in  their  industry.  In  other  words,  a  firm  is  omitted  if  ln ln  3 
TFP TFP 
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Here,  ,  ln  f t  TFP  represents the natural logarithm of the TFP level of firm f at time t, 
,  ln  f t  Q  stands  for real gross output  (real  sales  in  this  case)  of firm f  at time  t,  and 
, .  ln  f i t  X  is the natural logarithm of real input of production factor i (since there are 
three types of production factor – capital, labor, and intermediate input – the n for the 
sigma notation is 3 in this case) of firm f at time t.  , ,  f i t  S  represents the cost share of 
production factor i of firm f at time t.  ln  t  Q  is the geometric average of the output, at 
time t, of all firms in the industry to which firm f belongs, while  ,  ln  i t  X  stands for the 
geometric  average  of  the  input  of  production  factor i,  at time  t, of all  firms  in  the 






(16)  fjt  fjt  fjt  Y  D  R  intensity  D  R  /  &  &  = 
R&D fjt is the level of R&D investment of firm f in industry j in year t and we use 



















sales SALES SALES 
= 
=  ￿  and  fjt  SALES  stands  for  the  sales  of  firm  f  in 
industry j at time t. 
We use the inverse of the Herfindahl Index (  jt  INVHerf  ) as an explanatory variable, 
and  when  the  value  of  jt  INVHerf  is  closer  to  1,  there  is  more  competition  in  the 
industry. Since the Herfindahl Index only measures domestic market competition, we 
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where  jt  r  is the rental cost of capital,  jt  w  is the wage rate, and  M jt  p  is the price of 
intermediate goods in industry j at time t. The data for these variables are taken from the 
JIP 2006 database. We use  jt  LERNER  -  1  as our competition measure and the value 
becomes  closer  to  1  when  there  is  more  competition  in  the  industry.  As  a  result, 
jt  COMP  in Equation (14) is represented by either  jt  INVHerf  or  jt  LERNER  -  1  . 
We  expect  the  coefficients  on  the  competition  measures  (  jt  INVHerf  or 
jt  LERNER  -  1  )  to  be  positive  if  market  competition  stimulates  innovative  activity. 
However, Aghion and Griffith (2005) suggest that the relationship between competition 
and  innovative  activity  is  not  linear.  We  therefore  include  square  terms  of  our 
competition  measures  in  Equation  (14)  to  examine  whether  there  is  an  inverted­U 
relationship between competition and innovative activity. 
The control variables  included  in the estimation are the natural  logarithm of the 
number  of employees  of  firm f  at  time  t  (ln(   ) ft  Firm Size  )  to  control  for  firm  size18 
(Sizefjt) and the log of the age of firm f at time t (ln(   )  ft  Firm Age  ) to control for the 
effects of accumulated intangible assets (Agefjt) on firms’ productivity. The necessary 
data for constructing these variables are taken from the BSBAE database. 
In addition, to control for the effect of foreign ownership, we include  fjt  FO  , which 
is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when the firm is 33% or more foreign owned and 
0  otherwise.  In  addition,  we  include  firm  dummy  variable  (αf),  industry  dummy 
variable (αj), and time dummy (αt) variable. 
In order to examine the effect of new entry and regulation on innovative activity of 
incumbent  firms,  we  modified  Equation  (14)  to  include  a  regulation  index  and  an 
indicator of the technology gap among firms in an industry: 
(20) 
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The regulation index (  jt  reg  ) used in Equation (20) is taken from the Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan (2007). 
7  The regulation measure takes a value between 0 and 1 
and  its  value  decreases  the  more  a  market  has  been deregulated  compared  with the 
situation in 1995. If deregulation promotes new entry of firms, incumbent firms may 
increase their innovative efforts. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on  7  a  to take a 









fjt jt fjt  Tgap TFP TFP  = - 
The  coefficient  on  fjt  Tgap  expresses  the  catch­up  effect,  meaning  that  a  large 
technology gap stimulates innovative activity. However, as explained in the previous 
section,  firms  which are  far  from the  technology  frontier  may  be  discouraged  from 
engaging  in  innovative  activities  when  deregulation  makes  it  easier  for  firms  with 
advanced technology to enter the market. To examine this discouragement effect, we 
use  1  1 *  -  -  jt  fjt  FDI  Tgap  and  1  1 *  -  -  jt  fjt  reg  Tgap  ,  where  jt  FDI  is  an  industry­level 
variable  that  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  firms  for  which  the  foreign 
ownership ratio is over 33% of the total number of firms in the industry. This ratio is 
calculated from data provided in the supplementary tables of the JIP 2006 database. If 
there is such a discouragement effect operating, the coefficient on  1  1 *  -  -  jt  fjt  FDI  Tgap 




for the  case  when the  natural logarithm of  R&D  intensity is  used  as the  dependent 
variable. 
8  Since  Aghion  and  Griffith’s  (2005)  model that  we  use  here  analyzes  the 
innovative  behavior  of  incumbent  firms,  we  limit  our  sample  to  firms  that  already 
existed in the initial period in the estimation (1993). 
8  The summary statistics for the two cases differ because in the case where the log of R&D intensity 




First,  we  examine  the  linear  relationship  between  competition  and  innovative 




relationship  between  innovation  and  competition  using  our  two  measures  each  of 













Next,  we  examine  the  hypothesis  of  an  inverted  U­shaped  relationship  between 
competition  and  innovative  activity  using  Equation  (14).  The  estimation  results  are 























As  a  further  robustness  test,  we  also  divide  our  sample  into  two  sub­periods, 
1997­1999 and 2000­2003, and then re­estimate Equation (14). The results, shown in 
Table  7,  indicate  that  the  inverted  U­shaped  relationship  between  competition  and 
innovative activity holds only in the estimations for the 2000­2003 period. The results 
imply that  Japanese  firms’ innovative  activity has  become  more  sensitive  to  market 
competition in recent years in the context of very weak domestic economic growth. 
Insert Table 7 




results  imply  that  this  broader  measure  is  affected  by  the  domestic  competitive 



















The  coefficient  on  the  technology  gap  measure  is  positive,  as  expected  in  all 
specifications. This implies that there is a catch­up effect to best practice technologies in 
9  We also estimated Equation (20) with R&D intensity as the dependent variable. Doing so, we 
obtained results that provide strong support for the hypothesis of an inverted U­shaped relationship. 
However, the technology gap has a negative impact on R&D intensity, which contradicts our 
expectation. Moreover, we were unable to obtain any significant coefficients on the regulation 
variable, the foreign participation ratio, and the cross­terms of the technology gap measure and these 
two explanatory variables.24 
manufacturing  industries.  As  for  the  measures  of entry  barriers,  the  coefficients  on 
1  -  jt  reg  have  the  expected  negative  sign and  are  significant.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
coefficients on  1  -  jt  FDI  are negative and significant. This may imply that the entry of 
foreign firms with a very high level of technology has a very strong discouragement 
effect  on domestic  incumbent  firms.  The  coefficient on  1 1  *  fjt jt  Tgap reg  - -  is  positive 
and significant, implying that the discouragement effect hypothesis is supported in these 
estimations.  Although  the  coefficients  on  1 1  *  fjt jt  Tgap FDI  - -  are  insignificant,  the 
negative signs also support the discouragement effect hypothesis. 







has  introduced  various  pro­competition  reforms  and  that  import  competition  from 






10  For more details on FDI penetration in Japan see Paprzycki and Fukao (2008).25 
Insert Table 9 
5. Conclusion 

























problem,  we  should  employ  the  methods  developed  by  Olley  and  Pakes  (1996)  or 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
Additional  possible  extension  would  be  to  examine  the  spillover  effects  of 
innovation, following Tingvall and Poldahl (2007), or to include the effects of financial 
pressure and corporate governance in the estimation of R&D intensity, as in Hosono, 







fjt  Q  is real gross output and is defined as : 
(A1)  /  fjt fjt jt  Q sales output price  index  = 




the  working  hours  in  each  industry  are  taken  from  the  Monthly  Labour  Survey 
statistics” published by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. For capital, we take 
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from  the  BSBAE  database  are  used  as  labor  costs  taken,  and  operating  costs  and 
depreciation costs are available from the database.28 
In  order  to  calculate  the  cost  of  capital,  we  use  the  corporate  income  tax, 
government bond rate, long­term prime rate, price of capital goods, consumption of 
fixed capital (these variables are all taken from the JIP 2006 database), and loan/total 
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where  ftk  c  is firm f’s cost of capital in year  t, while  u  is the effective corporate tax 
rate,  r  is the bond rate,  i  is the long­term prime rate and  d  is the consumption of 
fixed  capital.  Finally,  z  represents the  expected present  value  of tax saving  due to 
depreciation  allowances  on  one  unit  of  investment,  which  is  obtained  using  the 
following formula: 
(A4)  {  }  [  ]  i  t  t  t  t  t  K  t  t  i  u  r  u  z  d  l  l  d  +  -  -  +  =  )  1  )(  1  (  /  * 
Appendix 2: Regulation Index 







they  restrict  activity.  For  example,  regulations  which  completely  prohibit  particular 
business  activities  in  an  industry  receive  a  weight  that  is  1,000  times  greater  than 
regulations that simply require firms to report to or inform the authorities. 
Specifically, the index is calculated as follows: 
(A5)  (  )  {  } 
it 
it j k jk 
jk 
RS WM WT N  = · ·  ￿ 
where 
RSit=  the  weighted  number  of  laws  and  rules  in  industry  i  (1­97) 







regulations  based  on  ministerial  announcements;  WT2=  regulations  based  on 
ministerial  ordinance;  WT3=  regulations  based  on  government  ordinance;  and 
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Table 1. Summary of Variables 
Variable  Definition  Unit of observation 
dlnTFP  Growth of relative TFP  Firm-year 
lnR&D/Y  Lagged R&D intensity; R&D intensity = R&D investment/real output  Firm-year 
α  ｆ  Firm dummy  Firm 
α  ｊ  Industry dummy  Industry 
α  ｔ  Time dummy  Year 
invHerf  Inverse of the Herfindahl Index; the more competitive the industry, the greater this value  Industry-year 
(1-LERNER)  One minus the Lerner Index; the more competitive the industry, the closer this value is to 1  Industry-year 
Tgap  Technology gap; the gap between the average relative TFP within the top 25% firms in the 
industry which the firm belongs to and the relative TFP of the firm 
Firm-year 
Reg  Regulation index  Industry-year 
FDI  The percentage firms in the industry for which the foreign ownership ratio is over 33%  Industry-year 
Imp  Import ratio (= imports/output); used to control for import competition in the industry  Industry-year 
ln(SIZE)  Logged number of employees in the firm  Firm-year 
ln(AGE)  Logged firm age  Firm-year 
FO  Foreign ownership; a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when the foreign investment rate is over 
33%, otherwise 0; used to control for the effect of foreign ownership 
Firm-year35 
Table2. Industry Distribution 
jipind  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 Total 
Livestock products  166  169  181  168  174  160  158  1,176 
Seafood products  136  134  137  138  133  143  136  957 
Flour and grain mill products  30  31  32  33  27  30  28  211 
Miscellaneous foods and related products  591  594  608  602  611  595  586  4,187 
Prepared animal foods and organic fertilizers  33  30  32  34  35  33  34  231 
Beverages  131  135  130  123  128  125  117  889 
Textile products  593  547  511  457  431  414  367  3,320 
Lumber and wood products  111  105  111  107  99  94  90  717 
Furniture and fixtures  116  110  115  115  108  112  105  781 
Pulp, paper, coated and glazed paper, and Paper products  335  324  332  326  313  287  285  2,202 
Printing, plate making for printing and bookbinding  428  434  435  421  421  423  427  2,989 
Leather and leather products  27  26  20  23  19  21  18  154 
Rubber products  109  110  110  106  109  108  97  749 
Basic organic chemicals, Chemical fertilizers  145  140  142  133  128  120  116  924 
Chemical fibers, Organic chemicals  14  15  12  13  11  14  7  86 
Miscellaneous chemical products  327  314  322  310  294  288  286  2,141 
Pharmaceutical products  168  166  162  159  174  171  170  1,170 
Petroleum products  27  25  25  24  23  23  20  167 
Coal products  17  19  16  19  25  19  19  134 
Glass and its products and Pottery  68  63  67  66  66  64  68  462 
Cement and its products  177  174  165  167  157  151  138  1,129 
Miscellaneous ceramic, stone and clay products  174  173  165  151  139  138  136  1,076 
Pig iron and crude steel  141  132  133  140  134  132  123  935 
Miscellaneous iron and steel  167  162  145  148  142  143  135  1,042 
Smelting and refining of non-ferrous metals  41  39  38  36  43  46  44  287 
Non-ferrous metal products  210  215  202  196  185  180  174  1,362 
Fabricated constructional and architectural metal products  264  249  246  226  216  211  212  1,624 
Miscellaneous fabricated metal products  466  478  479  479  453  437  443  3,235 
General industry machinery  179  188  175  161  151  147  146  1,147 
Special industry machinery  290  284  288  309  291  300  302  2,064 
Miscellaneous machinery  568  546  561  555  576  565  551  3,922 
Office and service industry machines  118  122  123  121  131  114  111  840 
Electrical generating, transmission, distribution and industrial apparatus  307  297  287  287  293  298  292  2,061 
Household electric appliances and Electronic equipment and electric measuring  117  108  99  86  81  80  83  654 
Electronic data processing machines, digital and analog computer equipment and accessories  137  136  144  133  130  140  140  960 
Communication equipment  212  220  215  203  189  176  161  1,376 
Electronic parts  514  537  549  518  473  484  475  3,550 
Miscellaneous electrical machinery equipment  157  147  146  164  163  167  158  1,102 
Motor vehicles, Part, Accessories and Other transportation equipment  164  173  166  149  145  153  144  1,094 
Precision machinery & equipment  249  266  256  246  231  249  238  1,735 
Plastic products  482  470  507  484  471  474  468  3,356 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries  185  188  184  186  173  175  166  1,257 
Total  8,891  8,795  8,773  8,522  8,296  8,204  7,974  59,45536 
Table3. Descriptive Statistics 
observation  average  std. dev.  minimum  maximum  observation  average  std. dev.  minimum  maximum 
dlnTFP t  59455  0.0053  0.0771  -0.6668  0.8508  29029  0.0067  0.0778  -0.6668  0.8188 
ln(R&D/Y) t  29029  -4.8042  1.5005  -11.0088  0.5017  29029  -4.8042  1.5005  -11.0088  0.5017 
† invHerf t-1  287  0.0105  0.0076  0.0004  0.0850  287  0.0099  0.0074  0.0004  0.0850 
† (1-LERNER) t-1  287  0.9059  0.1449  0.1113  1.2562  287  0.8957  0.1538  0.1113  1.2562 
Technology Gap t-1  59157  0.1229  0.0959  -0.3301  1.1300  28925  0.1089  0.0941  -0.3301  1.0858 
† reg t-1  287  0.4230  0.4191  0  1.0860  287  0.4455  0.4153  0  1.0860 
† FDI t-1  287  0.4089  0.8668  0  6.6929  287  0.5863  1.1011  0  6.6929 
ln(firm size) t-1  59455  5.1883  0.8987  3.9120  10.0026  29029  5.5071  0.9744  3.9120  9.9266 
ln(firm age) t-1  59455  3.5624  0.4937  0  4.7005  29029  3.6485  0.4655  0  4.7005 
† Import Ratio t-2  287  0.0953  0.1076  0.0017  1.0467  287  0.0951  0.1088  0.0017  1.0467 
FO t  59455  0.0150  0.1214  0  1  29029  0.0217  0.1458  0  1 
i) Observations of † variables are number of industries multiplyied by number of estimation periods. 
(Foreign ownership dummy) 
TFP growth model  R&D intensity model 
(import penetration) 




(Foreign frim perticipation ratio in 
the industry) 
(Technology Gap with Frontier firm) 
(regulation) 
(competition) 
(logged R&D intensity)37 
Table 4. Linear Estimation 
Variable 
invHerf t-1  0.3602  *  4.2889  * 
(Competition)  1.67  1.79 
(1-LERNER) t-1  0.0547  ***  0.3699  *** 
(Competition)  8.46  6.50 
IMP t-2  0.0350  ***  0.0373  ***  -0.2965  **  -0.2674  ** 
(International trade)  2.73  3.09  -2.07  -2.09 
ln(SIZE) t-1  0.0350  ***  0.0346  ***  0.1810  ***  0.1813  *** 
(Lagged employment)  10.97  10.99  4.23  4.44 
ln(AGE) t-1  -0.0075  **  -0.0052  0.0010  0.0061 
(Lagged firm age)  -2.07  -1.46  0.02  0.13 
FO t  -0.0084  -0.0106  0.0944  0.0824 
(Foreign ownership dummy)  -0.86  -1.21  1.14  1.16 
Constant t  -0.1431  ***  -0.1962  ***  -6.0309  ***  -6.3063  *** 
-4.71  -6.45  -16.81  -17.91 
59,455  60,163  29,029  29,834 
12,599  12,654  7,101  7,194 
43.7114  46.9374  4.3560  5.1956 
0.0735  0.0717  0.0073  0.0129 
0.0764  0.0805  0.0129  0.0160 
0.1415  0.1336  0.0054  0.0090 
i) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Dependent variable: TFP growth  Dependent variable: lnR&D/Y 
Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect 
Estimation 4-1  Estimation 4-2  Estimation 4-3  Estimation 4-4 
Yes 
Industry dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 





Number of observations 




Table 5. Competition and Innovation 
Variable 
invHerf t-1  1.2486  ***  7.3946  ** 
(Competition)  3.93  2.15 
invHerf 
2 
t-1  -40.8148  ***  -97.3002  * 
(Competition)  -9.11  -1.88 
(1-LERNER) t-1  0.0049  0.7380  *** 
(Competition)  0.33  5.64 
(1-LERNER) 
2 
t-1  0.0446  ***  -0.3305  *** 
(Competition)  4.24  -3.41 
IMP t-2  0.0302  **  0.0349  ***  -0.2818  **  -0.2362  * 
(International competition)  2.36  2.92  -1.98  -1.85 
ln(SIZE) t-1  0.0347  ***  0.0349  ***  0.1803  ***  0.1780  *** 
(Lagged employment)  10.86  11.11  4.23  4.37 
ln(AGE) t-1  -0.0081  **  -0.0051  0.0029  0.0061 
(Lagged firm age)  -2.20  -1.42  0.06  0.13 
FO t  -0.0082  -0.0106  0.0954  0.0833 
(Foreign ownership dummy)  -0.85  -1.21  1.15  1.17 
Constant t  -0.1414  ***  -0.1914  ***  -6.0318  ***  -6.3514  *** 
-4.63  -6.27  -16.90  -18.04 
59,455  60,163  29,029  29,834 
12,599  12,654  7,101  7,194 
46.1754  46.5511  4.3732  5.1644 
0.0791  0.0715  0.0067  0.0145 
0.0828  0.0811  0.0134  0.0166 
0.1562  0.1318  0.0048  0.0103 
i) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Yes 
Estimation 5-1  Estimation 5-2  Estimation 5-3  Estimation 5-4 
Yes 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dependent variable: TFP growth  Dependent variable: lnR&D/Y 
Yes 
Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect 









Number of observations 
Number of groups39 
Table 6. Estimation for Subsamples of Firms with and without R&D Investment 
Variable 
invHerf t-1  1.2210  ***  0.6877 
(Competition)  2.96  0.96 
invHerf 
2 
t-1  -44.0940  ***  -33.6190  *** 
(Competition)  -7.28  -2.90 
(1-LERNER) t-1  0.0131  -0.0864 
(Competition) 
0.77  -1.14 
(1-LERNER) 
2 
t-1  0.0523  ***  0.0150 
(Competition)  4.36  0.33 
IMP t-2  0.0381  **  0.0692  *  0.0426  ***  0.0623  * 
(International competition)  2.37  1.85  2.85  1.65 
ln(SIZE) t-1  0.0369  ***  0.0773  ***  0.0371  ***  0.0780  *** 
(Lagged employment)  9.03  7.83  9.24  7.88 
ln(AGE) t-1  -0.0074  -0.0093  -0.0040  -0.0101 
(Lagged firm age)  -1.34  -1.46  -0.73  -1.57 
FO t  -0.0061  -0.0072  -0.0090  -0.0062 
(Foreign ownership dummy)  -0.55  -0.29  -0.91  -0.25 
Constant t 
-0.1516  ***  -0.3363  ***  -0.2158  ***  -0.2708  *** 
-3.86  -4.47  -5.49  -3.35 
45,045  14,410  45,806  14,357 
11,384  6,305  11,459  6,257 
36.0563  8.7908  37.8020  8.4478 
0.0763  0.0520  0.0698  0.0467 
0.0927  0.0705  0.0942  0.0659 
0.1284  0.0788  0.1091  0.0677 
i) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Fixed effect  Fixed effect 
Dependent variable: TFP growth 






Estimation 6-4  Estimation 6-3 
Fixed effect 







Number of observations 
Number of groups 
Yes  Yes 






Table 7. Competition Effect After 2000 
Variable 
invHerf t-1  -0.6529  2.1483  ***  7.1530  4.4392 
(Competition)  -1.37  3.53  1.19  0.87 
invHerf 
2 
t-1  -13.8918  **  -61.5716  ***  -19.0669  -70.2434 
(Competition)  -2.01  -6.85  -0.19  -0.94 
(1-LERNER) t-1  -1.5450  0.0810  ***  0.7929  0.6969  *** 
(Competition)  -9.35  3.59  0.55  4.78 
(1-LERNER) 
2 
t-1  0.8538  ***  0.0394  ***  -0.4301  -0.4031  *** 
(Competition)  9.28  2.60  -0.53  -3.80 
IMP t-2  0.0455  *  0.0806  ***  0.0563  ***  0.0847  **  -0.0980  -0.5462  **  -0.0301  -0.4083  ** 
(International competition)  1.83  3.35  2.26  3.82  -0.43  -2.57  -0.14  -2.26 
ln(SIZE) t-1  0.0785  ***  0.0581  ***  0.0762  ***  0.0574  ***  0.1834  *  0.1546  **  0.2042  **  0.1413  ** 
(Lagged employment)  9.62  9.37  9.39  9.47  1.91  2.39  2.21  2.31 
ln(AGE) t-1  -0.0049  -0.0322  *  -0.0040  -0.0180  -0.0284  -0.0285  -0.0397  0.0202 
(Lagged firm age)  -1.05  -1.73  -0.88  -0.90  -0.53  -0.21  -0.75  0.13 
FO t  -0.0003  -0.0174  -0.0014  -0.0149  -0.1429  0.1323  -0.1357  0.0992 
(Foreign ownership dummy)  -0.02  -0.86  -0.12  -0.83  -1.23  1.46  -1.34  1.24 
Constant t  -0.3401  ***  -0.1984  **  0.3355  ***  -0.3386  ***  -4.8459  ***  -5.6192  ***  -5.4615  ***  -5.9582  *** 
-5.86  -2.50  3.60  -4.03  -5.82  -8.74  -5.62  -8.65 
26,459  32,996  26,758  33,405  12,907  16,122  13,259  16,575 
10,434  10,633  10,475  10,714  5,545  5,710  5,633  5,814 
14.3218  32.7480  16.4352  37.4449  10.3128  3.8339  50.0425  4.2980 
0.0284  0.0838  0.2490  0.0813  0.0061  0.0178  0.0000  0.0249 
0.0545  0.1230  0.0583  0.1328  0.0114  0.0138  0.0102  0.0166 
0.0527  0.1410  0.0454  0.1238  0.0064  0.0190  0.0000  0.0247 
i) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 




Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Estimation 7-5  Estimation 7-7  Estimation 7-4 
Dependent variable: TFP growth 
Industry dummy  Yes  Yes 




Dependent Variable: lnR&D/Y 
Estimation 7-8 
Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect 
Estimation 7-3  Estimation 7-6 














Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations41 
Table 8.  The Technology Gap and Entry Effects 
Variable 
invHerf t-1  1.2429  ***  1.2294  ***  1.2062  ***  1.1985  *** 
(Competition) 
3.93  3.89  3.81  3.79 
invHerf 
2 
t-1  -40.9376  ***  -40.7811  ***  -40.4556  ***  -40.3566  *** 
(Competition) 
-9.15  -9.13  -9.04  -9.03 
Tgap t-1  1.96E-01 ***  1.80E-01 ***  2.00E-01 ***  1.86E-01 *** 
(Technology gap 
with frontier firm)  19.86  14.67  19.53  14.41 
Tgap  t-1 *reg t-1  3.53E-02 **  3.09E-02 ** 
(Complimentarity with 
regulation)  2.30  1.99 
reg t-1  -4.48E-03 *  -4.63E-03 * 
-1.72  -1.78 
Technology Gap  t-1 *FDI t-1  -4.15E-03  -1.86E-03 
(Complementarity with 
foreign direct investment)  -0.59  -0.27 
FDI t-1  -0.0063  ***  -0.0065  *** 
(Foreign firm participation ratio 
in the industry)  -2.93  -3.02 
IMP t-2  0.0359  ***  0.0358  ***  0.0362  ***  0.0360  *** 
(International competition) 
11.33  11.28  11.40  11.36 
ln(SIZE) t-1  -0.0062  *  -0.0062  *  -0.0062  *  -0.0062  * 
(Lagged employment) 
-1.71  -1.70  -1.72  -1.71 
ln(AGE) t-1  0.0227  *  0.0234  *  0.0239  *  0.0242  * 
(Lagged firm age) 
1.79  1.85  1.90  1.92 
FO t  -0.0077  -0.0078  -0.0068  -0.0069 
(Foreign ownership dummy) 
-0.82  -0.83  -0.71  -0.73 
Constant t  -0.1743  ***  -0.1711  ***  -0.1724  ***  -0.1694  *** 
-5.69  -5.57  -5.62  -5.52 
59,157  59,157  59,157  59,157 
12,549  12,549  12,549  12,549 
52.6080  51.0792  50.9070  49.4270 
0.0879  0.0882  0.0899  0.0901 
0.1004  0.1006  0.1008  0.1009 
0.1690  0.1695  0.1728  0.1730 









Number of observations 




Industry dummy  Yes  Yes 
Yes  Year dummy  Yes 
(Regulation) 
Dependent variable: TFP growth 
Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect 
Estimation 8-1  Estimation 8-2  Estimation 8-342 
Table 9. The Technology Gap and Entry Effects 
Variable 
invHerf t-1  1.8143  ***  4.6335  ***  1.8809  ***  4.5867  ***  0.3913  3.5906  ***  0.4331  3.5156  *** 
(Competition) 
4.06  7.95  4.21  7.87  0.91  6.12  1.00  6.02 
invHerf 
2 
t-1  -94.0949  ***  -140.2075  ***  -94.9160  ***  -139.8568  ***  -71.1866  ***  -120.7221  ***  -71.5838  ***  -120.1100  *** 
(Competition) 
-14.43  -15.48  -14.56  -15.47  -10.95  -13.44  -11.02  -13.43 
Tgap t-1  9.78E-01 ***  7.69E-01 ***  9.89E-01 ***  7.36E-01 ***  1.00E+00 ***  7.93E-01 ***  1.02E+00 ***  7.58E-01 *** 
(Technology gap 
with frontier firm)  64.01  44.01  52.90  33.53  61.83  43.36  53.37  33.11 
Tgap  t-1 *reg t-1  -2.11E-02  1.12E-01 ***  -3.72E-02 *  1.05E-01 *** 
(Complementarity with 
regulation)  -0.93  3.32  -1.66  3.11 
reg t-1  -1.64E-05  -2.66E-02 ***  -1.26E-04  -2.65E-02 *** 
(Regulation) 
0.00  -4.24  -0.03  -4.24 
Technology Gap  t-1 *FDI t-1  -2.54E-02  -1.83E-02 *  -2.78E-02  -1.32E-02 
(Complementarity with 
foreign direct investment)  -1.15  -1.78  -1.26  -1.28 
FDI t-1  -0.0448  ***  -0.0353  ***  -0.0451  ***  -0.0366  *** 
(Foreign firm participation ratio 
in the industry)  -6.54  -7.81  -6.62  -8.08 
IMP t-2  0.0380  0.0128  ***  0.0362  0.0142  ***  0.0303  0.0093  ***  0.0270  0.0098  *** 
(International competition) 
1.71  0.60  1.61  0.66  1.35  0.43  1.20  0.46 
ln(SIZE) t-1  0.0094  0.0160  0.0098  0.0167  0.0086  0.0165  0.0094  0.0172 
(Lagged employment) 
1.43  2.77  1.50  2.90  1.32  2.87  1.45  3.00 
ln(AGE) t-1  0.0022  *  -0.0212  0.0022  -0.0228  0.0014  -0.0245  0.0014  -0.0268 
(Lagged firm age) 
0.56  -1.20  0.56  -1.28  0.37  -1.36  0.37  -1.47 
FO t  -0.0095  -0.0052  -0.0094  -0.0050  -0.0076  -0.0028  -0.0075  -0.0025 
(Foreign ownership dummy) 
-0.86  -0.32  -0.85  -0.30  -0.67  -0.17  -0.66  -0.15 
Constant t  -0.2582  ***  -0.1481  *  -0.2611  ***  -0.1326  *  -0.1632  ***  -0.0861  -0.1664  ***  -0.0684 
-4.42  -1.89  -4.45  -1.68  -3.09  -1.11  -3.13  -0.88 
26,379  32,854  26,344  32,806  26,344  32,806  26,344  32,806 
10,404  10,588  10,378  10,565  10,378  10,565  10,378  10,565 
98.5352  72.3819  94.8195  73.0810  101.8135  73.6775  98.4009  74.4843 
0.1117  0.1421  0.1120  0.1430  0.1129  0.1452  0.1133  0.1457 
0.3485  0.3673  0.3488  0.3688  0.3570  0.3746  0.3573  0.3758 
0.1234  0.1482  0.1241  0.1499  0.1194  0.1485  0.1198  0.1486 
i) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Yes 




year<2000  year>=2000  year<2000 
Estimation 9-6 
Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect 
Dependent variable: TFP growth 








Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 
















Estimation 9-4  Estimation 9-1  Estimation 9-3  Estimation 9-5  Estimation 9-7